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Nash Equilibrium: Dating and Cournot

By Benjamin Polak - Yale
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Lecture Description

We apply the notion of Nash Equilibrium, first, to some more coordination games; in particular, the Battle of the Sexes. Then we analyze the classic Cournot model of imperfect competition between firms. We consider the difficulties in colluding in such settings, and we discuss the welfare consequences of the Cournot equilibrium as compared to monopoly and perfect competition.

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Course Index

  1. Introduction to Game Theory
  2. Putting Yourselves into Other People's Shoes
  3. Iterative Deletion and the Median-Voter Theorem
  4. Best Responses in Soccer and Business Partnerships
  5. Nash Equilibrium
  6. Nash Equilibrium: Dating and Cournot
  7. Nash Equilibrium: Shopping, Standing and Voting on a Line
  8. Nash Equilibrium: Location, Segregation and Randomization
  9. Mixed Strategies in Theory and Tennis
  10. Mixed Strategies in Baseball, Dating and Paying Your Taxes
  11. Evolutionary Stability: Cooperation, Mutation, and Equilibrium
  12. Evolutionary Stability: Social Convention, Aggression, and Cycles
  13. Sequential Games: Moral Hazard, Incentives, and Hungry Lions
  14. Backward Induction: Commitment, Spies, and First-Mover Advantages
  15. Backward Induction: Chess, Strategies, and Credible Threats
  16. Backward Induction: Reputation and Duels
  17. Backward Induction: Ultimatums and Bargaining
  18. Imperfect Information: Information Sets and Sub-Game Perfection
  19. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Matchmaking and Strategic Investments
  20. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Wars of Attrition
  21. Repeated Games: Cooperation vs the End Game
  22. Repeated Games: Cheating, Punishment, and Outsourcing
  23. Asymmetric Information: Silence, Signaling and Suffering Education
  24. Asymmetric Information: Auctions and the Winner's Curse