Asymmetric Information
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We look at two settings with asymmetric information; one side of a game knows something that the other side does not. We should always interpret attempts to communicate or signal such information taking into account the incentives of the person doing the signaling. In the first setting, information is verifiable. Here, the failure explicitly to reveal information can be informative, and hence...more
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No matter what language people speak, there is much information that is not in their language. Right now, most of the information available online is in English, but that won't always be the case. Google has been interested in translation, especially as it applies to searching. As of this 2002 lecture, automated translation is not perfect, but co-founder Larry Page reports that they are working to make it better.
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Google has been caught in the middle of free speech vs. censorship issues. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act states that if a company removes information from the internet when requested, they cannot be held liable. If the company is then counter-notified, they can put the information back up and remain legally neutral. Google has followed this policy, says co-founder Larry Page, but it has nevertheless sparked controversy.
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The founders of Google, Larry Page and Sergey Brin believe that it is incredibly important for people to have access to information around the world -- and that this is something that Google can deliver. They have run into issues with foreign governments over censorship, but recently it has not been a major problem. CEO Eric Schmidt predicts that Google will become an unintended central focus around global copyright and ownership legal issues.
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Raikes talks about how Microsoft participates in a broad range of competitive and evolving businesses in the software industry. They are transforming into seven business: client (Windows), information worker business (Office), Business Solutions (small to medium businesses), server and tools, MSN, and Home and Entertainment (X-Box, PC gaming).
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This course is an introduction to game theory and strategic thinking. Ideas such as dominance, backward induction, Nash equilibrium, evolutionary stability, commitment, credibility, asymmetric information, adverse selection, and signaling are discussed and applied to games played in class and to examples drawn from economics, politics, the movies, and elsewhere.
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October 26, 2007 lecture by Paul Tang for the Stanford University Human-Computer Interaction Seminar. Even more fragmented than American health care is the management of health care information. Faced with a barrage of poorly organized health information, physicians and other clinicians must sift through uninspired displays to glean pearls of information necessary to make clinical...more
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We consider games that have both simultaneous and sequential components, combining ideas from before and after the midterm. We represent what a player does not know within a game using an information set: a collection of nodes among which the player cannot distinguish. This lets us define games of imperfect information; and also lets us formally define subgames. We then extend our definition...more
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Carly Fiorina, CEO of Hewlett Packard (1999-2005), talks about the importance of being able to distill enormous amounts of information. She explains how her experience in taking courses in Medieval History has helped her look at information selectively, a skill she has successfully applied in her corporate life.
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We discuss auctions. We first distinguish two extremes: common values and private values. We hold a common value auction in class and discover the winner's curse, the winner tends to overpay. We discuss why this occurs and how to avoid it: you should bid as if you knew that your bid would win; that is, as if you knew your initial estimate of the common value was the highest. This leads you to...more
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We first apply our big idea--backward induction--to analyze quantity competition between firms when play is sequential, the Stackelberg model. We do this twice: first using intuition and then using calculus. We learn that this game has a first-mover advantage, and that it comes commitment and from information in the game rather than the timing per se. We notice that in some games having more...more
